The internal obstacles included a South Vietnamese military culture that valued compliance with authority over initiative. More importantly, South Vietnamese senior leaders lacked proficiency at comparatively simple tasks like air-ground integration, as well as the complexities of synchronizing the efforts of a multi-brigade joint force. Externally, the greatest handicap facing the ARVN was a prohibition against U.S. forces conducting military operations outside the borders of South Vietnam. Legislated by Congress in the wake of the Cambodian incursion, the law barred U.S. ground forces from accompanying ARVN units into Laos in any capacity, even as advisors. As Willbanks writes, "for the first time ARVN would go into battle without their American advisors, " upon whom they were overly reliant for access to and integration of "enablers" such as close air support, medical evacuation, and logistical support.
Willbanks and Sander pull no punches in their sketches of the positions taken in Vietnam, in Washington, and in Paris where Henry Kissinger hoped to secure a cease-fire deal with the North Vietnamese that would allow the U.S. to declare victory and disengage from a politically damaging war. Nixon needed Lam Son to succeed in order to justify the Vietnamization policy he had adopted in 1969. Kissinger needed Lam Son to succeed as a way to pressure the North to reach an agreement. Nguyen Van Theiu, South Vietnam' s embattled president, needed the operation to succeed in order to safeguard the continued flow of supplies and military hardware to his country and thus prevent a Communist victory.
Finally, Abrams needed Lam Son to succeed because of his considerable investment in building up the reputation of senior ARVN commanders, including Lt. Gen. Hoang Xiang Lam, the commander of the ARVN I Corps. The number of competing agendas during both planning and execution is illuminating, and helps explain why the ARVN I Corps, after enjoying a brief period of success, ultimately sustained an operational defeat of significant proportions. Sander' s treatment of the debacle at Landing Zone Lolo on 3 March 1971 demonstrates his encyclopedic knowledge of the U.S. units, officers, and men who flew alongside him in support of the ARVN during Lam Son. His dispassionate description of the planning, equipment, and leadership challenges that adversely affected successful execution of this mission makes his analysis of Army shortcomings all the more damning.
Without resorting to invective, Sander uses contemporary sources to show that, even as late as 1971, American planners and commanders exhibited a shockingly low appreciation for the skill of North Vietnam' s army. Worse, the decision to entrust the mission to a newly created battalion without prior experience with planning or coordinating rotary-wing aircraft in combat can only be described as criminally negligent. Sander' s work, already much more deeply involved in detailing this event than Willbanks' , follows up with an excellent discussion of the second-and
